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tion," it declined to find that situation embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence
had just finished burning the
in Alexander. Id. at 711. The court 801 (d) (2) (0) and abandoned the tradistring from the jack wheels;
instead vacated the punitive award and tional common law approach which
and
remanded for retrial the questions of required" speaking authority" before
5) Grimes believed the cause
whether, and in what amount, A & A's the statement was considered an adof the fire was related to
conduct justified a punitive damages . mission of the principal.
Johnson's use of the acetylene
B & K Rentals and Sales Co. (liB
award. The court also suggested spetorch ...
cific instructions for the jury on re- & K") stored equipment used in its Id. at 641.
mand.
business of renting scaffolding and
The trial court excluded both
The Alexander opinion provides seating for public gatherings in a porStallings' and Klasmeier's reports.
fresh insight on how the Maryland tion of a warehouse owned by UniverThe
court ruled that the reports were
state courts should determine punitive
sal Leaf Tobacco Co. (" Universal "). inadmissible because each relied on
damages. Though the court determined that the standards set by case B & K brought an action for damages Grimes' hearsay statements, and neilaw were sufficient, it also acknowl- against Universal, contending that the ther qualified as admissions of a party
edged that Maryland courts in the past negligence of Universal and its em- opponent or as part of the res gestae
may have limited themselves too much ployees caused a fire which resulted in exception. Id. at 642. The court of
in reviewing punitive damage awards. a substantial amount of damage to B & special appeals affirmed. The Court
With the Haslip decision in mind, the K's equipment. Only two Universal of Appeals of Maryland granted cercourt in Alexander gave appellate courts employees were present and working tiorari to consider the laws under
a green light for considering due pro- at the warehouse on the day of the fire,
which evidence of admissions of party
cess when examining punitive damage one of whom died in the fire. B & K
opponents
were admissible.
awards.
never deposed or subpoenaed the surThe court began its analysis by reThe Alexander case also serves to
viving
employee,
Leonard
Grimes.
examining
the development of
remind attorneys and judges of the
The
parties
disputed
both
the
availMaryland's
case
law on vicarious adimportance of jury instructions for
ability
of
the
surviving
employee
as
a
missions. The court noted that Marypunitive damage awards. Juries must
be told that punitive damages serve to witness and B & K's efforts to locate land courts traditionally implemented
punish wrongdoers and deter others him at the time of the trial.
an evidentiary standard based on
from similar conduct. Juries need to
The case turned on the testimony agency law. Under this traditional
be aware of the standards for actual of an expert witness, Lieutenant Ken- test, the court required an agent to
malice and other factors, such as the neth J. Klasmeier, a fire investigator
have" speaking authority" before his
wrongdoer's net worth and ability to with the Anne Arundel County Fire
statements qualified as an admission
pay in order to make an informed
Department. Lt. Klasmeier based his of the principal. Id. at 643 (citing
decision.
testimony on a written report he re- Brown v. Hebb, 175 A. 602, 607 (Md.
- Catherine E. Head ceived from another Anne Arundel 1934».
Fire Department Investigator, LieuThe court recognized the probB & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. tenant James Stallings. Lt. Stallings lems inherent in the application of the
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. : MARY-based his report, regarding his inves- traditional test of agency law as an
LAND ABANDONS SPEAKING tigations of the origin and cause of the evidentiary standard. The court
AUTHORITY REQUIREMENT fire, primarily on Grimes' statements pointed out that the narrow formula of
AND" RES GESTAE" APPROACH at the scene of the fire. Grimes told admissibility under the traditional test
AND BINDS PRINCIPAL BY Lt. Stallings that:
was problematic because it" frequently
AGENT'SSTATEMENTSPURSU1) Johnson and he were the
caused courts to exclude the agent's
ANT TO F.R.E. 80Hd)(2l(D).
only two people working at
highly probative statement on the
In B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v.
the warehouse at the time of
theory that the employer had not auUniversal Leaf Tobacco Co., 596 A.2d
the fire;
thorized the agent to make damaging
640 (Md. 1991), the Court of Appeals
2) Grimes had lit an acetylene
remarks about him ... Id. at 643. (quotof Maryland held that a statement of a
torch for Johnson a couple of
ing 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
party opponent's agent, which conhours before the fire;
Weinstein's Evidence, § 801(d)(2)
cerns a matter within the scope of
3) Johnson was using the torch
(0)[01] at 219 (1988».
agency or employment and is made
to burn strings caught in the
The court next considered
during the existence of that relationjack wheels of a wooden dolly;
Maryland's expansion of the tradiship, may constitute an admission by
4) Grimes heard a popping
tionally narrow formula of admissibilthe party opponent. By so ruling, the
noise and saw smoke coming
ity through the adoption of the res
court of appeals adopted the principle
from the area where Johnson
gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
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Id. In setting forth the res gestae
exception, the court held that "in
order to bind the principal and thus
constitute an admission by it, the
agent's statement not only must concern matters within the scope of his
own agency authority but must also be
part of the res gestae, i. e., made
contemporaneously with the transaction to which it relates." Id. (quoting
Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp.,
439 A.2d 40, cen. denied, 293 Md.
331 (Md. 1982».
The court then looked at the failure of the Maryland courts to uniformly apply the contemporaneity aspect of the loosely defined res gestae
exception. The court stated that the
contemporaneity requirement is a totally unnecessary component of the
hearsay exception for vicarious liability. Id. at 644. The reliability of the
agent's statements stems from the assurance that, " [t]he agent is well informed about acts in the course of the
business, his statements offered against
the employer are normally against the
employer's interest, and while the
employment continues, the employee
is not likely to make the statements
unless they are true." Id. at 644 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 267, at
788-89 (3d ed. 1984».
The court acknowledged the general disfavor of the res gestae exception in academic and judicial circles.
The court noted that the phrase " is
condemned in academic circles as 'a
substitute for reasoning' and resulting
in 'the confusion of thought inevitably
accompanying the use of inaccurate
terminology. '" Id. (quoting Morgan,

and is made during the existence of
that relationship constitutes an admission of the party opponent.
The court then cited a variety of
factors which contributed to its decision to abandon the traditional common law rule in favor of the Federal
Rules of Evidence approach. The
court noted that the res gestae phrase
came into use when the theory of
hearsay was not well developed and
the various exceptions lacked clear
definitions. The court pointed out that
the " [i]ncreased knowledge as well as
the guidance of a significant majority
of other states and the federal rules"
indicated that the traditional approach
was" too restrictive and unsound. "Id.
The court further justified its decision to adopt the provisions ofF.R.E.
801(d)(2)(D) by noting various principles of fairness espoused by other
jurisdictions that have already adopted
the Federal Rules of Evidence approach. The court relied on the official comments to section 80 1(D)(3) (a)
of Louisiana Code's Evidence Article
to show the unfairness of the employers position under the common law
approach. "[I]t may be said that, in
accord with principles of substantive
law, one who undertakes to create an
agency relationship should generally
be made to reap the deleterious as well
as the beneficial effects of what the
agent sows." B & K, 596 A.2d at 646
(quoting official commentto La. Code
Evid. Ann. art. 801(D)(3)(a) (West
1986). Furthermore, the court noted
theF.R.E. 801 (d) (2) (D) is moreequitable than the common law, in that the
judge is given discretion to weigh the
A Suggested Classification oj Utter- probative value of the evidence against
ances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 the possibility for prejudice to the
Yale L.Rev. 229,229 (1923». Con- opponent.
Applying the Federal Rules of
cluding that the phrase res gestae was
too" nebulous," the court adopted the Evidence approach to the case before
more precise analysis embodied in it, the court of appeals held that Grimes'
Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(D). Id. at statement at the scene of the fire was
645. Federal Rule of Evidence admissible. The court concluded that
. 801 (d)(2)(D) provides that a statement there was sufficient evidence, indemade by an agent of a party opponent pendent of the statements, to prove
which concerns a matter within the " that 1) Grimes was Universal's agent;
scope of the agency or employment 2) Grimes' statements concerned ac-

tivities undertaken in the warehouse
that were within the scope of his
employment; and 3) Grimes' statements were made during his employment." Id. at 647.
The B & K decision is significant
in that the court of appeals abandoned
the strict common law approach which
required that the agent have" speaking
authority" or that the agent's statement be part of the res gestae. Thus,
the court illustrated its dissatisfaction
with the exclusion of valuable probative evidence, which was the frequent
result under the common law approach
and adopted the approach under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.

- Gloria A. Worch
Newell v. Richards: BURDEN OF
PROOF AS TO STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE DOES
NOT SlDFT TO PLAINTIFF
REGARDLESS OF FINDINGS
OF HEALTH CLAIMS
ARBITRATION PANEL.
In Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d
1152 (Md. 1991), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a health
claims arbitration award in favor of
the defendant health care provider,
which was based solely on the running
of the statute of limitations, did not
serve to shift the ultimate burden of
proof to the plaintiff with respect to
the running of the statute of limitations. In reversing the court of special
appeals, the court held that a health
claims arbitration award would be
presumed correct as an evidentiary
matter, but would not serve to shift the
burden of proof from the defendant to
the plaintiff as to the statute of limitations.
In July of 1980, Estella Newell
was diagnosed at the Greater Baltimore Medical Center ("GBMC") as
having cancer of the uterus and on
September 30, 1980, she underwent a
total hysterectomy. Follow-up treatment consisted of external radiation
treatments administered by Dr. George
1. Richards, Jr., which took place
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